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This article makes a conceptual and theoretical contri-
bution to the study of diffusion. The authors suggest that
the concept of diffusion be reserved for processes (not
outcomes) characterized by a certain uncoordinated
interdependence. Theoretically, the authors identify the
principal sources of clustered policy reforms. They then
clarify the characteristics specific to diffusion mecha-
nisms and introduce a categorization of such processes.
In particular, they make a distinction between two types
of diffusion: adaptation and learning. They argue that
this categorization adds conceptual clarity and
distinguishes mechanisms with distinct substantive
consequences.
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The renaissance of diffusion research in polit-ical science has corrected an imbalance in
the study of democratization and economic lib-
eralization. Indeed, an irony of the veritable
stampede to explain waves of democracy and
promarket reform is that scholars have left
undeveloped the very dynamic implied by the
waves themselves: that one transition increases
the probability of another transition (i.e., diffu-
sion). To be fair, scholars have rarely assumed
that state actors operate independently of the
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decisions of their counterparts in other capital cities. In fact, their assumption is
probably just the contrary. Nonetheless, the supply of clear hypotheses and accom-
panying empirical tests concerning the how, when, and why of democratic and
neoliberal diffusion is decidedly limited. This state of affairs is changing on several
fronts. Most of the advance has occurred on the empirical side, as scholars using
cross-national data have attempted to track the patterns and sequence of adoption
of democratic and liberal economic reform.1 Accompanying these efforts has been
a renewed interest in refining econometric methods to estimate spatial and net-
work effects (Anselin and Cho 2002; Ward and Gleditsch 2002; Franzese and Hays
2004). This article contributes to the theoretical and conceptual component of this
valuable research program.
Our goal is to distill some conceptual, theoretical, and substantive insights from
recent empirical work on diffusion and to suggest a framework for future research.
Conceptually, we review the use and meaning of the concept of diffusion and
related terms, most of which are usually invoked only metaphorically and so lack
precise meaning. Theoretically, we introduce a framework of diffusion processes
that, we believe, adds conceptual clarity and emphasizes the substantive implica-
tions of the various mechanisms. This last point distinguishes our framework from
others. We argue that diffusion research would benefit from attention to the per-
formance and efficiency implications of various mechanisms of diffusion. Such
attention entails a shift from historical concerns to more political (even normative)
concerns such as maximizing social welfare, a natural extension of diffusion
research.
Three Sources of Policy Clustering
Diffusion research is motivated by the observation that nation-states, or some
other jurisdictional unit, choose similar institutions within a fairly circumscribed
period of time. Such behavior results in temporal and spatial clusters of policy
reform. Why might such clustering occur?2 Consider three general classes of expla-
nation (Figure 1). One conventional answer is that countries respond similarly, but
independently, to similar domestic conditions. For example, countries democra-
tize because of political or economic pressures within their country—pressures
that exist simultaneously for leaders in other countries. The assumption underlying
such explanations is that decision makers operate without regard to the behavior
(perceived or predicted) of other states. We might think of such an explanation as
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the baseline answer, one predominant in comparative politics and international
political economy and, undoubtedly, one with some causal power.
A second alternative is that clustered policy making is coordinated by a group of
nations, a hegemonic power, or an international organization. Examples of this
type might include the “horizontal” processes of international collaboration and
cooperation described by scholars of “epistemic communities” (Haas 1992) or the
“vertical” processes such as coercion by important donor countries and interna-
tional financial institutions (see Levi-Faur 2005 [this volume] on the “vertical/
horizontal” distinction).
There is a third possibility, however, that combines an element from each of
these first two alternatives. One might think of it as a set of processes characterized
by interdependent, but uncoordinated, decision making. Under this conception,
governments are independent in the sense that they make their own decisions
without cooperation or coercion but interdependent in the sense that they factor in
the choices of other governments. In other words, uncoordinated interdepen-
dence. This is exactly the class of mechanisms for which we reserve the term diffu-
sion. To be sure, it is a decidedly general class of processes. One can imagine a fair
number of mechanisms that satisfy its criteria: for example, learning, imitation,
bandwagoning, emulation, and mimicry. Even economic competition, to the
extent that it affects policy choice, fits this definition of diffusion (Elkins, Guzman,
and Simmons 2004; Simmons and Elkins 2004). Having stipulated this definition,
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EXPLANATIONS FOR CLUSTERED DECISIONS
we should stress that we have no interest in conceptual proliferation; if anything,
our hope is to consolidate terms and encourage a shared vocabulary.
The Concept of Diffusion: Cause or Effect?
“Diffusion” is one of several important social science constructs in need of defi-
nitional clarity. Its use is widespread and growing. A rough indicator of such is its
appearance in journal titles in sociology and political science. Since 1950, fifteen to
twenty titles with diffusion appear each decade until the 1990s, when the number
spikes to thirty-seven.3 Yet its meaning across these studies is muddled. A principal
source of confusion, we find, concerns its use as both outcome and process.
The term comes into our thinking in part as a metaphor from the natural sci-
ences and, as such, usefully evokes the image of the spread of something across
space. For some scholars, diffusion connotes just that: an outcome characterized
by a disseminated practice or policy. For example, Strang and Soule (1998, 266)
and Eyestone (1977, 441) defined it as the “spread of something within a social sys-
tem” and “any pattern of successive adoptions of a policy,” respectively. As such,
the term suggests the dispersion or dissemination of a practice4 throughout a popu-
lation: that is, multiple adoptions of basically similar practices. In the natural sci-
ences, diffusion usually refers to the spread of molecules from an area of high con-
centration to one of low concentration, resulting in a more uniform, and thinned-
out, distribution of the molecules. With the spread of social practices, however, this
sense of “thinning out” is irrelevant, if not altogether wrong. That is, the source or
epicenter of diffusion is not necessarily “depleted” when the practice spreads to
another area. Likewise, the version of the practice that spreads is not necessarily
any less intense.
For most sociologists and political scientists, however, “diffusion” is not an out-
come but the flagship term for a large class of mechanisms and processes associ-
ated with a likely outcome. Consider several prominent examples:
the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time
among the members of a social system. (Rogers 1995, 5)
[when] prior adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters the probability of adop-
tion for remaining non-adopters. (Strang 1991, 325)
The implication is an interdependence among units such that the adoption of the
practice by one actor alters the probability of its adoption by another. This is the
important sense of diffusion expressed in Strang’s (1991) definition. The idea of
diffusion-as-process as opposed to diffusion-as-outcome is often quite pro-
nounced. In some studies, one will sometimes even see an explanatory variable
labeled “diffusion” in a multiple regression table—an explicit designation of diffu-
sion as a process. Thus, some refer to diffusion as an outcome and imply a process,
while others (a majority) define diffusion as process and imply an outcome.
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Should we think of diffusion as a dependent or independent variable? Following
the majority of diffusion scholars, our preference is to treat it as a class of mecha-
nisms (specifically, those characterized by uncoordinated interdependence).
Moreover, while such mechanisms will very likely lead to the dissemination of the
policy or practice in question, it is critical—at least, analytically—to de-link process
from outcome. Some mechanisms that we may still wish to call diffusion may not
result in the widespread dissemination of a given practice. Consider, for example,
the case in which a policy adoption serves as a model to be emulated by some coun-
tries and to be avoided by others. Reforms in the United States, because of the
country’s mixed international reputation, often inspire just such a polarized effect
(Elkins 2003). This simultaneous attraction and repulsion may not result in any
substantial spread of the practice at the macro level, but it may produce diffusion-
like effects upon closer inspection (i.e., clustering along different networks). Simi-
larly, one can imagine waves of policy adoption that we would not describe as diffu-
sion. Consider, for example, a practice that spreads throughout a population as
actors adopt it in concert, but independently. It is reasonable to think that reforms
provoked by exogenous shocks—such as economic slumps and natural disasters—
would be enacted regardless of the actions of other states. Such a reform would
surely be one of mass adoption and dispersion, but if it lacks an exchange of some
sort between actors, it is not diffusion as scholars have come to use the term. As
such, it does not make much sense to tie the idea of dissemination to the definition
of diffusion, although their association is logical and natural.
We are left, then, with a definition that focuses on process, not outcome. All
things considered, Strang’s (1991) definition appears to capture fairly concisely the
meaning of diffusion of interest here. Strang defined diffusion as the process by
which the “prior adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters the probability
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TABLE 1
SELECTED TERMS RELATED TO DIFFUSION
Diffusion-as-Outcome Diffusion-as-Process
Isomorphism (Powell and Contagion (Li and Thompson 1975;
Dimaggio 1991) Midlarsky 1978)
Convergence (Kerr 1983; Bennett 1991; Spatial Autocorrelation (Anselin 1988)
Drezner 2001)
Waves (Huntington 1991) Demonstration Effect (Huntington 1991)
Homophily (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954) Imitation (Westney 1987; Jacoby 2000)
Homogeneity Mimicry (Meyer and Rowan 1977)
Emulation (Bennett 1991)
Policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000)
Bandwagoning (Ikenberry 1990)
Galton’s Problem (Ross and Homer 1976)
Cascades (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer,
and Welch 1998)
of adoption for remaining non-adopters,” a definition that captures the idea of
uncoordinated interdependence while leaving open the question of the practice’s
spread.
The duality of diffusion as cause and effect helps us categorize some of the vari-
ous concepts related to diffusion, which tend to fall along one of the two dimen-
sions. Terms such as “isomorphism” or “contagion” give further meaning to the
nature of dispersion and of interdependence, respectively. Table 1 presents a short
inventory of such terms.
Types of Diffusion
Note that in the above definition, the kind of interdependence implied by diffu-
sion is left largely unspecified. As we illustrate further below, an actor’s adoption
can alter the probability that another will adopt in both positive and negative, indi-
rect and direct, ways. Nevertheless, there is one important quality that distin-
guishes diffusion mechanisms from other interdependent, or “international,”
explanations of policy dispersion. The interdependence in diffusion is uncoordi-
nated. Thus, the actions and choices of one country affect another, but not through
any collaboration, imposition, or otherwise programmed effort on the part of any
of the actors. This distinction splits a large group of explanations that some scholars
prefer to lump as “external,” or “international,” factors. For example, in a pioneer-
ing study of such factors, Whitehead (1986) catalogued a set of “international”
explanations of democratization, which included everything from imperialism to
imitation. Such categorization often leads to research questions that pit “internal”
or “domestic” influences against “external” or “international” influences. Of
course, no explanation is so neat as to be wholly international or wholly domestic.
Nevertheless, it is appropriate to characterize diffusion as one of a set of “interna-
tional” or “external” explanations in the sense that it shares with such explanations
the element of interdependent decision making. We should think of diffusion as an
important subtype of international factors characterized by the lack of
coordination among actors.
A number of scholars have attempted to catalog the processes involved in diffu-
sion (Savage 1985; Powell and Dimaggio 1991; Strang and Soule 1998; Jacoby
2000; Levi-Faur 2005). Upon inspection, one can suggest any number of motives
and pressures involved in interdependent processes. Our perusal of the literature
uncovered upwards of thirty distinct species of diffusion, as we have defined the
class of mechanisms. How one categorizes these processes, of course, will depend
upon the purposes of the study and one’s taste for parsimony. In our work, we have
found it useful to lump and split mechanisms for both theoretical and normative
reasons. That is, mechanisms in the same family should exhibit the same causal
logic, and ideally, this shared logic should lead to a distinctive social welfare out-
come. Can we, in other words, identify diffusion mechanisms that yield superior
results for a country’s citizens? We suggest a division of diffusion mechanisms that,
we believe, makes just such a distinction. We think of diffusion mechanisms as one
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of two kinds: those for which another’s adoption alters the value of the practice and
those for which another’s adoption imparts information. Each of these two broad
classes, adaptation to altered conditions and learning, comprises a set of varied
mechanisms. Below, we identify and describe three important mechanisms within
each class, although this list is not meant to be exhaustive. We should also empha-
size that mechanisms within these two classes are often complementary. David
Levi-Faur (2004), in a constructive critique of Simmons and Elkins (2004), pointed
out very clearly how such mechanisms can operate simultaneously.
Under this conception, governments are
independent in the sense that they make their
own decisions without cooperation or coercion
but interdependent in the sense that they factor
in the choices of other governments. In other
words, uncoordinated interdependence.
Adaptation to altered conditions
In this class of mechanisms, the policy decisions of one government alter the
conditions under which other governments base their decisions. Typically, the
decisions alter the value of the policy for others. In this sense, one can think of
these decisions as producing externalities—externalities that subsequent adopters
must factor into their decision calculus. One can imagine any number of mecha-
nisms that might fit under this class. We identify three critical ones below: cultural
norms, support groups, and competition.
Cultural norms. Norms may be understood as common practices whose value to
an actor stems largely from their prevalence in a population. We can think of them
almost like network externalities, then, since the benefits of adopting rise as a
direct result of the number—or proportion—of others that adopt. But exactly what
kinds of benefits accompany increases in prevalence? In terms of norms, the pre-
dominant benefit is reputational. Joining a growing majority of other actors confers
a degree of legitimacy or, in the case of a negatively valenced practice, cover from
criticism.
The logic behind these factors follows very closely the “tipping,” or “threshold,”
models that Schelling (1978) and Granovetter (1978) have described. The basic
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intuition is that most actors are highly sensitive to the number, or proportion, of
other actors that have adopted the policy. The idea of “thresholds” or “critical mass
points” is a useful (although not necessary) device with which to understand the
process. Consider an example from Granovetter. An individual faces the decision
of whether to participate in a riot. Arguably, the probability that one would partici-
pate in a riot increases as the number of participants increases (the logic being that
the greater the number of participants, the greater the immunity from apprehen-
sion).5 There is a certain level of participation, a threshold at which an individual
will decide to participate in the riot. Presumably, these thresholds will be different
for different individuals. For example, Schelling suggested that it is usually the case
that 5 to 10 percent of the population is committed to one choice or the other,
regardless of what others decide to do, and the rest are highly dependent, but to
different degrees, on the choices of others.
Pragmatic policy makers considering political
reform are cognizant that they are joining a
network of other users on which they will
depend for advice, support, and service of these
very same institutions.
One can imagine countless examples of such threshold behavior. Schelling’s
(1978) absorbing book runs us through everything from professional hockey play-
ers’ use of helmets to seminar attendance. What is common to these examples is
that an increase in the number or proportion of adopters confers a certain degree
of legitimacy, or immunity in cases of illicit practices, upon the potential adopter.
Our contention is that this dynamic describes the way social norms function with
respect to economic and political reform. Consider the case of political rights poli-
cies. There one sees that a country’s propensity to maintain a policy that is viewed
negatively in the international community—say, the death penalty—decreases as
the proportion of countries with that policy decreases. It is only a small number of
countries (e.g., the United States) whose threshold for world approbation is so high
that they have, at least to date, resisted the wave of changes. The death penalty is
but one example. Other political and civil rights should work the same way.
Of course, the tipping effect can go the opposite direction as well. That is, actors
may be tempted to opt out of a practice once a certain number of others have
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adopted it. This will occur if there is some fear of crowding or a desire for unique-
ness. One may imagine that this dynamic occurs with “isolate” nations such as
Libya or Cuba. However, while isolate nations may be more comfortable with their
uniqueness, it is not the case that they seek it. Cuba under Fidel Castro, for exam-
ple, found itself alone only after the Cold War. Until then, Castro sought a much
more central position in the international community and actively promoted a “tip”
in the opposite direction than that which occurred in 1989.
Support groups. Numbers of participants, or adopters, can confer credibility or
immunity on a practice. There are other ways—apart from reputation—that the
number of users alters the incentives for adoption. As economists who study indus-
try standards have found, users derive practical benefits from a strong network of
other users (Katz and Shapiro 1985, 1986). The simplest case is that in which the
number of users directly increases the value of the product, as in the case of a tele-
phone network in which the greater the number of individuals who subscribe, the
more people there are with whom one may communicate. A well-known example
of this phenomenon is the story of the QWERTY keyboard. Because of the positive
network externalities associated with following the QWERTY standard (that is,
access to the growing number of QWERTY typists), typewriter manufacturers
failed to adopt more efficient keyboards (David 1985).
However, one can imagine a set of more indirect benefits arising from a strong
network of users, benefits that are critical to the choice of economic or political
practices. One of these is the increase in technical support. It is well known that
consumers of everything from automobiles to computer software are drawn to the
technical support benefits accompanying a large network of users. For example, in
the social sciences, the statistical software Stata, and more recently R, have
become predominant in part because of the enormous advantages of add-on pro-
gram code developed and shared by their large communities of users. Forces of
this kind are equally strong in the development of economic and political policies.
Policies to regulate capital flow or rules to regulate the powers of the legislature
and the president are not especially easy for a government to design and maintain
on its own. It is extremely helpful to have a community of users, preferably one
with skills and knowledge, who are committed to refining and improving the prac-
tice. Adopting countries desire pools of expertise that they can draw on for policy
enhancements and ancillary policies. Elkins (2003) showed that these sorts of
externalities are important to constitutional delegates faced with the choice of
electoral system and that of presidentialism versus parliamentarism. Pragmatic
policy makers considering political reform are cognizant that they are joining a net-
work of other users on which they will depend for advice, support, and service of
these very same institutions. Like that for cultural norms, the mechanism in the
technical support argument follows very closely the dynamic that Schelling (1978)
and Granovetter (1978) set forth in their tipping models. That is, each government
will have a certain threshold of the number (or quality) of users, below which it will
not be likely to adopt a policy.
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Competition. Competition over scarce resources is another diffusion mecha-
nism that alters the payoffs of policies for governments. Essentially, one country’s
adoption of a political or, more likely, economic policy can have a very strong effect
on its competitiveness, whether that be for foreign capital, direct loans, a contract
to host the Olympics, or any investment or honor. Simmons and Elkins (2004)
made this argument with respect to transitions to liberalization in the capital
account, current account, and exchange rates. The argument is simple. If we
assume that governments are interested in attracting capital investments in their
country, and we assume that restrictions on exchange rates and the capital and cur-
rent accounts increase the price of investing in a country’s market, then it is easy to
see how the one country’s adoption of liberal policies will disrupt the competitive
equilibrium for other countries. By removing restrictions, the price of a country’s
investment products dips and lures investors away from investments in other coun-
tries with higher prices. Ceteris paribus, a government would prefer more invest-
ment at home, and so there is some pressure to adopt liberal policies as a result of
similar moves elsewhere. Of course, there are benefits to restrictive policies
(namely, stability), which may predispose a government to restrict absent competi-
tion. Competitive forces will necessarily compete against these motives. Competi-
tion is not commonly considered a type of diffusion, but it shares the essential
qualities that characterize more ideal instances of diffusion.
Diffusion via learning
The second broad class of diffusion mechanisms concerns the exchange of
information or, from the perspective of the adopter, learning.6 In a critical sense,
these approaches are quite different from those discussed above. In learning pro-
cesses, another actor’s adoption does not alter the conditions of adopting. Rather,
the action provides information about such conditions, including the benefits and
drawbacks of adopting.
The premise behind such explanations is that the actions of others are more
instructive to the individual than are his or her internal drives or needs. The work of
social psychologists has done much to substantiate this premise in the past fifty
years. Among others, Festinger’s (1950) theory of social comparison and Merton’s
(1968) work on reference groups are prominent statements of this doctrine.
Bandura’s (1977) social learning theory has been especially useful to diffusion
scholars. In Bandura’s model, individuals are not equipped with internal reper-
toires of behavior. Except for the most basic reflexes, actors are almost fully
dependent upon external models for understanding the consequences of certain
actions.
How does social learning operate in the context of institutional development?
Under the best of circumstances, policy makers in nation-states learn in the same
way social scientists might. That is, they recognize a problem in the organization or
execution of service delivery, develop some basic theory about how to solve the
problem, review the various solutions available, and attempt to ascertain the effec-
tiveness of these solutions. Such is the “laboratory of democracy,” where California
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can learn from Wisconsin’s welfare experiment or from Oregon’s health care trials.
The same process occurs at the international level. Westney’s (1987) account of
policy borrowing in Japan during the nineteenth century demonstrates this sort of
learning.
What is interesting about learning, from a diffusion perspective, are the numer-
ous ways that it can go wrong. The worldwide policy environment turns out to be a
sloppy laboratory, and inefficiencies develop as a result of some predictable biases
and limitations in the learning process. The fundamental problem with social
learning at this level is that national policy makers often have difficulty assessing
the consequences of the various policies. Policy makers are “cognitive misers”
(Fiske and Taylor 1991) as much as anyone else. As boundedly rational actors, they
rely upon a set of cognitive heuristics to make sense of these sometimes compli-
cated policy choices. We describe three important learning “methods” (or, rather,
biases) that cognitively constrained policy engineers follow.
Information cascades. In the situations of the greatest uncertainty, actors may
have no other information than the knowledge of whether others have adopted the
policy. In this case, individuals may reason that they should take advantage of the
accumulated wisdom of past individuals’ decisions. The logic is the same that one
would use in choosing between two restaurants that are equal in many obvious
characteristics: a common decision rule is to choose the restaurant with more
patrons. The trouble, of course, is that aggregated decisions can point to what
appears to be a clearly optimal restaurant (or policy, as it were) even if these deci-
sions are the result of a few and important choices by early adopters (who may or
may not have had good information).
We can call this sort of problem an information cascade. Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer, and Welch (1998) developed a model of this process that demonstrates
that choices of an entire sequence of actors can depend exclusively on the decisions
of the first two or three actors. This can be true not only if the actors are initially
indifferent about the choice but also if they are predisposed against the choice of
the first three!
Thus, it is conceivable that information cascades will produce convergence
toward one policy choice even in situations in which actors know nothing other
than who has adopted what policy. Of course, in reality actors may try to gather
more information than simply who has adopted what practice. Specifically, they
may hope to draw inferences about the effectiveness of the various policies. Again,
however, policy makers are limited by the data available to them, their resources to
undertake analysis, and their own cognitive faculties. These limitations encourage
a process of learning characterized by a dependence on highly selective samples of
policy models. Below, we describe two processes that have predictable diffusion
effects: learning from available models and learning from those in one’s reference
group.
Learning and availability. Individuals often have difficulty retrieving a full sam-
ple of information and tend to base their decisions on only those instances that are
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available to them (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Weyland 2004).7 The
result is that the choice set of policy makers will be limited to policies of states that
are immediately accessible. Actually, these highly available models bias the learn-
ing process in a number of ways. One way, of course, is that the more available the
model, the more likely it will be included as a data point in the analysis of alterna-
tives. As such, these models will also be amenable to less scientific methods of anal-
ysis by policy makers who, seeking to legitimate predispositions or conclusions
they already hold, introduce these cases as representative examples in a less
deliberate, more rhetorical forum.
What is interesting about learning, from a
diffusion perspective, are the numerous ways
that it can go wrong.
Another way that a policy’s availability can affect an actor’s decision is through
increased familiarity. Taste—whether it be for food, music, art, or political par-
ties—is often acquired, and individuals have a tendency to prefer practices familiar
to them. Such attraction might stem in part from a strategy of risk reduction: famil-
iar choices may appear to be safe choices. However, it is also probable that familiar-
ity breeds appreciation and shapes tastes. As such, surrounding oneself with highly
available examples of policy can lead to an appreciation, or at least tolerance, for
that policy.
Thus, a policy’s availability can distort the learning process and increase its
chances of adoption in another country in a number of ways. In the international
arena, which policies will be more available than others? One clear expectation is
that experiences of those governments with which one communicates and inter-
acts will be most available. Indeed, the idea that communication among actors
transmits ideas is one of the prevailing assumptions in the broad diffusion litera-
ture (Rogers 1995). However, it is also likely that the policy of prominent nations
will be highly available, and consequently, policy makers will tend to weight those
cases disproportionately. For example, it is likely that for many democratizing
countries, the United States will be the most available case of presidentialism. So
while the performance, however measured, of presidential systems may be poor in
the sample at large, it may appear high to those who have difficulty retrieving less
well-known (and less well-performing) cases of presidentialism.
The most available policy models, perhaps, are those that are reputed to have
been successful. Decision makers will understandably be drawn to such a policy,
44 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
sometimes letting its success bias their evaluation of its effectiveness. Consider an
example from Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982):
In a discussion of flight training, experienced instructors noted that praise for an especially
smooth landing is typically followed by a poorer landing on the next try, while harsh criti-
cism after a rough landing is usually followed by an improvement on the next try. The
instructors concluded that verbal rewards are detrimental to learning. (p. 10)
These practiced analysts made this judgment while ignoring the phenomenon of
regression to the mean. Policy analysts often do the same thing. For example, they
observe a short period of tremendous success or failure and make projections for
the policy based on those early high or low marks. Enthusiasm over the initial suc-
cess of a single program, for example, the fiscal program Domingo Cavallo
designed for Argentina in the early 1990s, can fuel fad-like adoptions. Similarly, a
year or so of abject failure can lead analysts to soundly reject any program of its
kind. Long-term trends or low-profile cases—both of which are less “available”—
will have less of an impact.
Learning and reference groups. Actors may pay more attention to some policy
models more than others because they are more available. However, they may also
prefer policy models from countries that are similar to theirs. In fact, a reliable
finding in the voluminous literature on diffusion and social influence is that entities
that share similar cultural attributes tend to adopt the same practices.8 This is true
not only of individual behavior like teen smoking (Coleman, Katz, and Menzel
1966) and voting (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995) but also of collective behavior with
respect to corporations (Davis and Greve 1997), nonprofit organizations (Mizruchi
1989), subnational states (Walker 1969), and indeed nations (Deutsch 1953). Why
is this so? The primary reason is that imitating similar individuals is one of the sim-
plest and most effective cognitive heuristics in the calculation of utilities. Actors
negotiating a complex set of political choices regard the actions of actors with per-
ceived common interests as a useful guide to their own behavior. A growing num-
ber of political scientists suspect that such shortcuts allow the mass public to nego-
tiate a complicated political world (Brady and Sniderman 1985; Lupia and
McCubbins 1998), and it is likely that the same sort of process describes the rea-
soning of leaders making difficult policy decisions. Rosenau (1988, 359; 1990, 213)
posited just such a process, suggesting that decision makers have a strong
“cathectic” sense of whom their nation should look like and model their
government accordingly.
So which countries are likely to be relevant reference groups? For decision
makers, the easiest way to identify appropriate reference groups is to compare
their visible characteristics. Some of the more visible and defining national charac-
teristics are geographic and cultural: the country’s region, the language its citizens
speak, the religion they practice, and the country’s colonial origins. It follows, then,
that policy makers will align their country’s policies with those of geographically
and culturally proximate nations.
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Implications of Diffusion Types
Years ago, Dankwart Rustow (1970, 347) justified the study of transitions to
democracy by paraphrasing Georges Clemenceau that “history is far too important
a topic to be left just to historians.” Of course, it is no longer necessary—if it ever
was so—for “transitologists” to defend questions of regime development in main-
stream comparative politics and international relations journals. Indeed, explain-
ing waves of political reform as tidal as “democratization” and “neoliberalism” con-
stitutes a major subfield within comparative politics. Nevertheless, Rustow’s
defense highlights an unease with “genetic” versus “functional” research questions
within political science. Specifically, one wonders whether (as political scientists) it
is to our comparative advantage to trace the origin of political species as opposed to
describing and predicting their effects. To be sure, fifty years of thriving scholar-
ship on the topic are enough to demonstrate the value of the former. Furthermore,
it is worth emphasizing that the effects of policies and institutions have their roots
in the origins of these entities. As such, genetic and functional explanations neces-
sarily converge. Just the same, it is incumbent upon “genetic” scholars to remind
readers of the substantive implications of their historical findings.
To be sure, diffusion explanations are intriguing in their own right. Part of the
intrigue is that diffusion implies that governments are making choices that they
would not make if left to their own devices. These “detours” in the policy process
are indeed interesting from a historical or political development perspective. How-
ever, they also portend important consequences for the quality of government poli-
cies. In particular, we see two interesting possibilities. Policy detours may mean
that governments adopt suboptimal or inappropriate policies designed for the
needs of others. Alternatively, detours may mean that governments adopt policies
superior to those they have the resources or knowledge to engineer for themselves.
The question, then, is whether diffusion is responsible for a nation’s squeezing into
ill-fitting but fashionable institutions or whether it leads them to the most func-
tional and efficient ones available? We might lean toward the first conclusion, if
only for our cultural preference for creativity and originality over imitation and
conformity. However, the second conclusion appears equally plausible, especially
after a number of scholars have begun to burnish the image of imitation, emphasiz-
ing its utility as a cognitive shortcut for problems whose answers are not always
obvious (e.g., Lupia and McCubbins 1998). Imitation, in this light, is not slavish. It
is an efficient and effective mode of behavior for policy makers. Thus, we see two
distinct possible outcomes. Below, we argue that these outcomes depend crucially
on the particular mechanism of diffusion.
To begin, recall the distinction between adaptation and learning. This categori-
zation divides two classes of mechanisms with wholly different theoretical founda-
tions—theoretical, that is, in the sense of the individual behavioral motivations and
processes at work. The intrinsic difference rests on whether individuals are moti-
vated by changes in the payoffs associated with different practices or if they are
motivated by changes in their “scientific” evaluation of the practices. As a practical
46 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
matter, this distinction is useful in that it stakes out the theoretical space well: the
simple binary division is exhaustive, while still parsimonious. In the interest of
knowledge accumulation, the hope is that this division organizes mechanisms into
useful “schema,” which will be useful to future researchers. While such organiza-
tion can be useful in the interest of improving scholarly discussion, the theoretical
distinction that we suggest divides two sets of mechanisms with potentially oppo-
site implications for social welfare. That is, the distinction between classes of diffu-
sion has real consequences for the quality of institutional reform. Specifically, we
suggest that mechanisms of diffusion in the adaptation class are likely to lead to the
adoption of suboptimal institutions—institutions inferior to even those that actors
could engineer themselves. On the other hand, those mechanisms in the learning
class are likely to result in optimal institutions, institutions that actors would not
necessarily have the means or motivation to design themselves.
The question, then, is whether diffusion is
responsible for a nation’s squeezing into
ill-fitting but fashionable institutions or
whether it leads them to the most functional
and efficient ones available?
This difference in outcome results from two unrelated factors. First, actors
driven by a shift in payoffs (adaptation) may or may not develop practices that are
suited to their needs. By definition, the actors’ focus is not on the merits and out-
puts of the institutions themselves but on the ancillary benefits associated with the
adoption of the institution. In the case of learning, however, actors are focused
squarely on the merits of the institution. In fact, the desire for a more efficient set
of institutions is the very motive for their search through the foreign database of
policy alternatives. Admittedly, some of what we call learning is hardly scientific.
Indeed, some scholars may prefer a more general label for such mechanisms, say
“information motives,” that does not imply a studied, deliberate decision process.
Nonetheless, even through cognitively constrained methods of research, actors
can be successful in approximating the results of a more sophisticated methodol-
ogy. Also, their motive to improve their institutions suggests that they will more
often than not do better for themselves by searching internationally than they
would if left to their own devices.
ON WAVES, CLUSTERS, AND DIFFUSION 47
A second factor that distinguishes the welfare effects of these two sets of pro-
cesses is the level of commitment and internalization associated with the adopted
institution. Here, we suggest that institutions only really work when there is a firm
commitment to their installation. Part of this commitment involves what we might
call the “internalization” of the principles undergirding the reform. Actors inter-
nalize the principles and rationale of the reform when they accept and understand
the need for reform, as well as the logic of the reform. Accepting the rationale and
the logic of the reform leads to a certain degree of commitment to implementing
the reform and seeing it through.
Therefore, we can expect diffusion to have very different implications for social
welfare according to the particular mechanism at work. Identifying the mecha-
nisms of diffusion, in this sense, takes on more importance than a simple account-
ing of historical sources. Indeed, understanding the path to institutional reform
tells us much about the probable performance of the reform. With the widespread
adoption of democracy and market reforms, albeit with very different degrees of
success, such distinctions become increasingly important.
Conclusion
A principal goal of this article is to identify a useful set of concepts and mecha-
nisms for the empirical investigation of diffusion. Given the recent acceleration in
empirical work on the subject, however, we also hope to stimulate a more active
and focused research program examining the language and causal processes of dif-
fusion. Understandably, the empirical methods and data needed to test the pres-
ence of various mechanisms will likely lag behind their specification. Nonetheless,
it is essential to map out potential causal paths, whether or not they can be sub-
jected to empirical validation. Most important, it is critical that researchers
develop expectations for the substantive implications of their theorized causal
paths. Investigation of these implications represents a logical extension and payoff
for diffusion scholars.
Notes
1. A critical mass of diffusion scholarship has emerged on both democratization (Starr 1991; O’Laughlin
et al. 1998; Coppedge and Brinks 1999; Kopstein and Reilly 2000; Elkins 2003; Gleditsch and Ward 2004) and
economic reform (Simmons and Elkins 2004; Weyland 2004). This special issue is the first to apply it to the
field of regulation.
2. We prefer to think of this as “clustering” rather than “convergence.” The latter seems to suggest (at least
to us) a move toward universal adoption of a policy or institution. However, since we leave open the possibility
of diffusion resulting in pockets of like policies—that is, local homogeneity, but global heterogeneity—we
prefer the term “clustering.”
3. Findings from a search on the term “diffusion” in titles of articles in the JSTOR archive of political sci-
ence and sociology journals.
4. “Practice” is the general term for an idea, technology, policy, or innovation that spreads. “Adoption” is
the term used when an actor selects or takes on the practice.
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5. Corroborating experimental research from social psychology substantiates the principles of the tipping
model. For example, Asch’s (1951) work on conformity showed that individuals were much more likely to
trust their own information when they had just one or two confederates siding with them. Some “safety in
numbers” is also evident in the Milgram (1975) experiments on obedience.
6. See Meseguer (2005 [this volume]), Lazer (2005 [this volume]), and Wilson (2004) for interesting elab-
orations of learning mechanisms of diffusion.
7. Kurt Weyland (2004) linked this and other cognitive heuristics to diffusion in a very useful framework.
8. As Rogers (1995, 274) stated, “The transfer of ideas occurs most frequently between individuals . . . who
are similar in certain attributes such as beliefs, education, social status, and the like.”
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